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Preventing Accidents in Offshore Oil and Gas Operations: the US Approach
and Some Contrasting Features of the Norwegian Approach.
Michael Baram, Professor Emeritus, Boston University Law School.
mbaram@bu.edu)
September 2010 
[Note: this paper is for Professor Preben Lindoe’s project on Robust Regulation. Part 5 will be
added for its completion.]
Introduction.
This paper presents an analysis of the legal framework and regulatory approach
of the United States (US) for preventing accidents in the development of the oil
and gas resources of its outer continental shelf (OCS). It encompasses the legal
and regulatory regime prior to the blowout in April 2010 at the Deepwater
Horizon drilling rig operated by British Petroleum (BP) and developments
following this worst case accident.
The purpose of this paper is to determine how the legal framework influences
safety regulation and the safety management practices of companies carrying
out exploration and production operations on the OCS. Discussion is focused
on prevention of major accidents which harm workers and the offshore and
coastal environments, but also deals with some aspects of emergency response.
The analysis does not attempt to assign fault or blame for the BP accident to BP
or its industrial partners and contractors, nor to exonerate any of these parties,
because these issues are currently being investigated by special commissions,
the Congress, and several courts.
Finally, references are made to Norwegian laws and regulations governing oil
and gas operations in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. Norway, with 40
years of OCS experience, is the world’s largest offshore oil producer and
second largest offshore natural gas producer, and has achieved a high level of
safety. The references therefore illuminate a proven alternative approach for
preventing OCS accidents.
1. Social and Political Context for OCS Operations.
The US claims more seabed of the OCS than any other nation. For several
decades, it has leased portions of this seabed, mainly in the Gulf of Mexico
(GOM) and off the south coast of Alaska, to companies for exploration and
production of oil and gas resources, and regulated these operations to prevent
accidents and harms to workers and the environment. Most of the other regions
of the US OCS have been closed to exploitation activities by moratoria enacted
by Congress which were stimulated by the 1969 blowout and oil spill at an
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Amoco platform off the California coast and the 1988 Exxon Valdez tanker
accident and spill in Alaska’s Prince William Sound.
Since the 1940’s, federal agencies have issued numerous leases and permits to
companies for exploration and production activities in regions not covered by
the moratoria. According to the Minerals Management Service (MMS), the lead
offshore agency since 1982, more than 50,000 wells have been drilled in the
federal portion of the GOM since 1947, and in early 2010, there were an
estimated 7,000 active leases and 3,600 structures in the GOM providing 97%
of all US offshore oil and gas production. [1]
MMS also reports that since the mid-1990’s, several factors have encouraged
major expansion of deepwater ventures (variously defined as projects
conducted in more than 500 or 1000 feet of seawater). These include the
depletion of shallow water resources, laws authorizing royalty relief for
deepwater leases, studies showing significant resource potential in deepwater
regions, and technological advances such as semi-submersible mobile drilling
rigs and positioning software. As a result, deepwater OCS oil production
surpassed shallow water oil production in 2001, and by 2009, nearly 4,000
deepwater wells had been drilled in seawater depths exceeding 1,000 feet,
including 700 in water depths exceeding 5,000 feet. Overall, by 2009, wells in
OCS depths exceeding 1,000 feet accounted for 80% of US oil production and
45% of gas production offshore.
These activities provide substantial benefits to the US economy. In 2009,
companies working in shallow water and deepwater paid the federal
government $6 billion, and provided 150,000 jobs. Expansion of deepwater
operations would provide more of these benefits.
According to a 2006 study by the US Department of the Interior (DOI), 15 billion
barrels of deepwater oil and 60 trillion cubic feet of deepwater gas have been
discovered and are available for production, with high potential for discovering
another 86 billion barrels of deepwater oil and 420 trillion cubic feet of
deepwater natural gas. DOI concluded that at current rates of consumption,
these actual and prospective amounts would be sufficient to replace all oil
imports into the US for almost 25 years and provide for all US gas consumption
for more than 20 years. Of these amounts, an estimated 45 billion barrels of oil
remain to be discovered in the GOM, 92% of which is in deepwater regions.[2]
Additional benefits from expanding deepwater operations have been claimed,
particularly the capture of natural gas hydrates (which are expected to be
commercially produceable in the near future), estimated at close to 320,000
trillion cubic feet in deepwater regions of the federal OCS, including more than
7,000 trillion cubic feet in deepwater sediment in the GOM. A former federal
official estimates that production of 1% of this resource would generate
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payments to the federal government of approximately $7.5 trillion, and when
added to $4.5 trillion in prospective payments from exploiting the estimated
deepwater oil and gas noted above, the total amount “almost completely pays
off the current national debt without raising taxes”.[3]
Proponents of expanding deepwater activities claim that in addition to
increasing payments and jobs, the operations would provide fuels at low
prices, meet growing consumer demand and national energy needs, lead to
“energy independence” from unreliable or hostile foreign sources, capture the
limited number of deepwater drilling rigs available from global sources, and
ensure national security.
Over the last decade, political and public support has grown considerably as
prices for oil and gas increased, causing Congress in 1995 and 2005 to enact
laws which provide financial incentives for deepwater projects, including
suspension of company obligations to pay royalties on production.[4] In 2008,
governors of several coastal states and some environmentalists dropped their
opposition to offshore drilling, and President Bush ended the long-standing
Presidential ban on new OCS leases and urged Congress to end the moratoria
which had closed parts of the OCS off the Atlantic coast and the eastern section
of the GOM. [5]Although opponents continued to raise concerns about risks in
lawsuits and Congressional hearings, a July 2008 poll showed that 74% of the
public supported more offshore drilling.[6]
Indications that deepwater activities posed new technical problems, such as
those experienced by Chevron at its "Tahiti" site in 4,000 feet of GOM seawater,
were countered with many assurances of safety: e.g. that drilling within 200
miles of the US coast 'had a 99% safety record", "only .001% of the oil produced
had been spilled", and that more oil contamination of the oceans comes from
natural seeping, shipping and runoff from land than from oil spills.[7]
Despite some committed opponents, political and public omplacency about the
risks had set in. On March 31, 2010, President Obama announced a new leasing
plan for previously closed regions of the GOM, the Atlantic OCS, and the
Chukchi and Beaufort Seas off the northern Alaska coast.[8]
Three weeks later, on April 20, 2010, the devastating accident and
uncontrollable spill occurred at the BP drilling rig operating in 5,000 feet of
water at the Macondo site in the GOM. This tragic event has caused public
outrage, numerous investigations and lawsuits, doubts about industrial ability
to safely conduct deepwater operations, and many initiatives to reform the
legal and regulatory regime for OCS operations.[9]
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2. Risks of OCS Operations.
Deepwater and shallow water projects alike pose risks of blowouts, explosions,
fires, harms to workers, spills and contamination of ocean and coastal
environments, disruption of socio-economic activities, and destruction of
corporate facilities and other assets. Spills and environmental contamination
have been of most concern to the public because of the Amoco blowout in
1969 and the Exxon Valdez accident in 1989.
The BP blowout and spill, a true worst case scenario, now dominates the public
discourse on OCS policy, and has prompted an intense search for risk
information for two related purposes: to evaluate the performance of regulatory
agencies, operators and contractors prior to the BP accident, and to guide the
development of new legislation and regulatory reforms to ensure that future
OCS operations will be more safely conducted..
Ongoing investigation of the BP accident itself is a continual source of much
useful risk information. The blowout caused an explosion and fire which killed
11 workers on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, destroyed the semisubmersible mobile drilling rig leased by BP from Transocean which operated
the rig under BP supervision, and ruptured the exploratory well casing at
several points. As a result, the uncontrolled release of oil and gas followed, and
efforts to stop the release by several methods failed. The release continued at a
rate estimated at 40,000 barrels of oil each day for 87 days before a temporary
cap on the main release point proved to be successful. Other measures
including two relief wells are being advanced at this time to ensure more
permanent control.
The spill has contaminated a large region of the GOM and the coastal areas of
several states, with severe impacts on wildlife and social and economic
activities such as tourism and commercial fishing. Depending on ocean currents
and weather, the spill may eventually reach the Mexican coast and parts of the
Atlantic coast of the US. Use of chemical dispersants and various means of
skimming and containing the spill were of limited value, and the dispersants
and oil are creating chemical exposure problems for workers involved in
emergency response and mitigation efforts. [10]
Numerous lawsuits are being brought by persons who suffered personal injury,
property damage, and economic loss, and state and federal governments are in
the process of imposing penalties and other sanctions on BP. Investigations are
underway and criminal prosecutions may follow.
Because of this disaster and the scale of its consequences, much attention is
now being given to gathering information on OCS risks and the harms that
accrued to workers and the environment prior to the BP accident as well as any
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analyses of the information by regulatory agencies. This information is needed
to develop effective changes in legislation and regulation.
Thusfar, such information is fragmented and incomplete, and indicates that the
two agencies with responsibilities for ensuring safety, MMS and the Coast
Guard (CG), had not proritized the systematic collection, evaluation and use of
information on near misses, accidents and other aspects of operating
experience in the years preceding the BP accident. Doing so would have
enabled them to engage with industry in learning processes and continuous
improvement of operational safety before the BP accident At least two reasons
for this failure are discussed subsequently in this paper, one being the
“regulatory disarray” that has characterized the relationship between MMS and
the Coast Guard (CG) on safety matters, the other being their wholesale
delegation of safety initiative-taking to industrial organizations such as the
American Petroleum Institute (API) without following up on industrial
performance.
A month after the BP accident, the Department of Interior (DOI), of which MMS
is a regulatory unit, presented a brief summary of risk information regarding
blowouts and spills that occurred prior to the BP accident: e.g. that during the
expansion of deepwater drilling since 1996, the blowout rate per well had not
increased but the number of spills had increased; spills in the GOM were “not
major” and those due to blowouts from 1971 to 2010 amounted to some 1800
barrels, with 425 of these being attributable to hurricane damage; and since
1964, only 30.3 barrels were spilled per million barrels produced on the OCS..
It concluded simply that the rate of spills increased since the mid-1990’s as
deepwater activities increased, indicating “significant challenges” in preventing
a blowout in deepwater. No reference to international experience is made other
than mention that major deepwater spills occurred at Ixtoc I off the Yucatan
coast in 1979 and Montara in the Timor Sea in 2009.[11] No risk information
has been provided by the Coast Guard (CG).
Additional risk information derived from operating experience before the BP
accident has also been presented by MMS in announcing its proposed SEMS rule
on June 18, 2010.[12] Its intention to enact this “safety and environmental
management system” rule was first announced back in May 2006 by a
published notice seeking comments. Comments were received but MMS took no
further action until prompted by the BP accident four years later.
In proposing SEMS, MMS presented risk information derived from its
investigations of accidents and operator non-compliance, performance reviews,
and reports on 33 OCS accidents between 2000 and 2007. For the 33 accidents,
MMS found that 16 resulted in 14 fatalities and 7 injuries, that one or more of
“four functions” were implicated in each accident, along with several
“contributing causes”. The functions were hazard analysis, management of
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change, written operating procedures, and mechanical integrity; and the
contributing causes were lack of communication between the operator and
contractors, absence of job hazard analyses or written procedures, supervisor
failure to enforce procedures, lack of safe work procedural guidelines, failure to
carry out recommended maintenance, and failure to identify or correct
workplace hazards.
MMS also presented data on another 1,443 OCS incidents that occurred over
the same years. These involved 41 fatalities, 302 injuries, 10 losses of well
control, 11 collisions, 476 fires, 356 “pollution events”, and 224 crane and
hoist mishaps. It states that the majority of these incidents were related to
operational and maintenance procedures or human error, were not related to
MMS inspections for hardware compliance, and only 25 were due to safety
device failure. It also states that operating procedures and mechanical integrity
accounted for the greatest number of spills, without any discernible trend of
industrial improvement over the seven year period despite its issuance of some
150 findings of non-compliance per year regarding production and drilling
operations. Further discussion of SEMS is presented later in this paper.
Notably missing from its documentation of risk information is any data or
insight from the Coast Guard (CG), which shares inspection and other OCS
regulatory responsibilities with MMS, or from the American Petroleum Institute
which is the leading private group relied on by MMS and CG for setting
industrial standards. Also missing is risk information from the insurance sector
which provides coverage for offshore operations on the US OCS and worldwide.
A hint of what can be culled from the insurance sector is provided by a recent
report of the Insurance Information Institute which summarizes data on major
OCS accidents and spills around the world. [13]
Nor has MMS presented any risk information from the OCS operations of other
countries. This information could illuminate differences in injury, accident and
spill rates between countries and provide a basis for investigating possible
causes of superior and inferior rates, including the regulatory approach
involved as well as various physical, operational, and cultural factors
The potential value of having international information is shown by the results
of a recent search by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) comparing incidents under US
and European regulatory regimes. The WSJ found that for each 100 million
hours worked during the years 2004-2009, the US incurred 4.84 OCS worker
fatalities, more than 4 times the European (North Sea) rate of 1.07 fatalities,
with the US injury rate for workers being 23% greater than the European rate. In
addition, the US reported 5 major losses of well control in 2007-2008, whereas
5 other major countries (Norway, UK, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands), with
about half as much drilling activities, reported no such incidents. [14]
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The disparities, according to the WSJ, resulted from over-reliance by US
agencies on industrial organizations to develop standards and best practices,
the slowness of the industrial response, and the failure of MMS to follow up on
industry. One example is provided: that in 2000, MMS asked industry to advise
on cementing for well control and spill prevention, and that 10 years later in
2010, the leading industrial standards organization, the American Petroleum
Institute (API) acknowledged that it had not yet provided the advice. A footnote
to this story should be that a cementing failure is believed to be one of the
main causes of the BP accident.
Congressional research staff have also sought risk information regarding harms
to workers, but have been frustrated because death and injury reporting
systems do not distinguish between onshore and offshore operations. Thus, all
that the researchers could report was data for 2009 showing that GOM
incidents involved 4 deaths, that 290 injury-causing incidents occurred, and
that 145 fires and explosions reported to MMS for that year “may or may not
have caused fatalities or injuries”. [15]
It appears that additional information on OCS risks with potential value for
improving regulation has been gathered from time to time by MMS but lost in
its bureaucracy. A good example is a 1998 study by an MMS consultant on “The
Environmental and Safety Risks of an Expanding Role for Independents in the
Gulf of Mexico”. This study dealt with concerns that an expanded role for
“smaller independents” (companies with assets less than $500 million) in the
GOM would pose greater risks to worker safety and the marine environment
because it was assumed they lacked the technical or regulatory skills of “the
majors” (the largest oil and gas companies such as BP) or the “large
independents” (assets of $500 million or more).[16]
Using data from MMS “events” and platform inspection files, and regression
models to examine the association between accidents and operational and
regulatory variables, the study found that independents outperformed majors
and that MMS inspections and other factors influence the occurrence of spills.
The nominal accident rate per million platform hours was 3.34 for majors, 3.01
for large independents and 2.08 for small independents. Similarly, the weighted
accident rate which distinguished between accidents according to their severity
was 8.00 for majors, 5.35 for large independents and 3.85 for small
independents. Differences between majors and independents measured in spills
were found to be “similar but more extreme”, with rates of 255 barrels spilled
per million platform hours for majors and 24 barrels for independents.
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The study concluded that large and small independents were less likely to have
a workplace accident or spill during exploration and production operations than
the majors. A cynic may ask whether this MMS-sponsored study was objective
or designed to serve an MMS agenda for increasing OCS operations. In any case,
it has not been determined if the study was put to any use by MMS and the CG.
Finally, there is another source of risk information, the environmental impact
assessment process carried out by MMS and companies seeking OCS leases
and permits. This process, with public involvement, is required by the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of any agency intending to take an action which
may pose significant threats to the natural and human environments. NEPA
requires that full information on the intended action and its possible adverse
consequences be developed and the results provided to other agencies and the
public for feedback on their concerns and thereby enable the proposing agency
to consider the concerns and determine if it should modify its intended action
to lessen its impacts or withdraw its intended action.[17] For actions which
would permit OCS operations, MMS has also had the opportunity to use the
NEPA studies to determine if project design and contingency plans are sufficient
to deal with or avoid the impacts and if not, to stipulate conditions it believes
necessary. However, MMS performance has been seriously flawed, as discussed
later in this paper.*
Although robust implementation of NEPA can generate useful information for
mitigating the potential impacts of a specific project, it usually does not
provide technical or operational information that can be used by an agency
such as MMS to improve accident prevention. NEPA is directed at the estimation
of possible environmental consequences of the agency action that could arise
under routine and reasonably foreseeable accidental circumstances, and does
not require that worker safety and management systems for accident
prevention be addressed. Thus, NEPA does not provide the quality information
needed for improving worker safety and accident prevention in OCS operations.
To sum up, at this time risk information on worker safety and accident
prevention in the OCS context is very incomplete. Nevertheless, many proposals
for new legislation and changes in regulation are being advanced by Congress,
DOI and the media, and courts are dealing with several hundred lawsuits. Thus,
the context for regulatory reform is highly charged and politicized.
__________________________
* Opponents of agency actions often file lawsuits in federal courts claiming that NEPA studies
are substantively deficient. If successful, the result is a court order that requires the agency do
a more thorough study to fulfill the NEPA requirement, thereby delaying the agency action until
a more complete study or a modified action proves to be acceptable to the opponents or the
courts.
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3. Legal Framework.
The legal framework governing activities on the US OCS is comprised of an
uncoordinated collection of numerous laws enacted by Congress over more
than 200 years. For example, there are laws which establish jurisdiction over
the OCS and federal ownership of its mineral resources, divide authority
between the states and federal government over coastal waters and submerged
land, and govern harbors, navigation, vessels, pipelines, and fishing, Additional
laws protect national security interests, the rights of native American peoples,
marine mammals, endangered species, prevent air and water pollution and
disposal of toxic waste, require environmental impact studies, and authorize
liability for personal injury, property damage, and harms to natural resources.
Within this framework, the law authorizing OCS oil and gas operations is the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).[18] This law, frequently amended
since its enactment in 1953, authorizes the federal Department of the Interior
(DOI) and its MMS unit to conduct OCS leasing programs, issue permits to
companies for exploration and production, and carry out a regulatory program
to ensure that these activities are safely conducted.. It also authorizes
regulation of workplace safety on the OCS by the Coast Guard (CG).
Because Congress has not fully integrated the many laws applicable to the OCS,
the framework is not coherent or harmonized. In addition, some of these other
laws are implemented by regulatory programs with detailed rules, procedures
and decision-making criteria, resulting in a multitude of legally-enforceable
requirements that apply to offshore activities. This has made MMS
implementation of OCSLA extremely complex.
Even more complexity is created by judicial decisions. Under OCSLA and other
laws, agency rules, standards, lease and permit decisions and other final
actions can be appealed to a federal court by individuals, companies and other
private parties whose interests are impacted. The subsequent judicial review
will either affirm the action in question or find it invalid on grounds that it is
“arbitrary”, lacks a sufficient factual basis, violates procedural requirements, or
conflicts with a Constitutional doctrine. Because agency actions are frequently
appealed, the courts play a major role in shaping the application of laws and
regulations to OCS activities and to OCSLA implementation in particular.

*******
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In contrast, Norway, the world’s largest offshore oil producer and second
largest natural gas producer [SOGM], has been working for many years at
developing a more coherent, integrated and less complex legal framework for
regulating health, safety and environment in the conduct of OCS oil and gas
operations. Following a Royal Decree in 2001[19], a comprehensive Framework
Regulation [Framework] was enacted and became effective in 2002, and several
Ministries developed conforming “common regulations” that year.[20] The
Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) was then created in 2004 to supervise
coordinated implementation of the regulations, and a revised and even more
integrated version of the Framework Regulation will become effective in January
2011.[21] Facilitating this integration process is the tendency in Norway to
resolve conflicts by means other than recourse to the courts, such as by
mediation or appeal to higher administrative authority instead. [22]

Another difference between the Norwegian and US regulatory regimes is that
Norway has allocated leasing and regulatory responsibilities to separate
agencies to ensure that regulatory activities are not compromised by leasing
programs and goals. Since 2004, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD)
carries out leasing activities and its prior regulatory function has become the
responsibility of an independent agency, the PSA. [23] As noted above, OCSLA
vests both responsibilities in the DOI and its MMS unit. But since the BP
accident, DOI and Congress are taking steps to separate these responsibilities
and allocate them to different newly created agencies, following the Norwegian
approach.

*******

To return to further examination of OCSLA, this law stipulates that leases and
permits are conditional upon company compliance with MMS regulations, other
applicable federal regulations, and state laws which are “not inconsistent” with
federal law. It also authorizes MMS to suspend activities when health, wildlife or
the environment are threatened, and to cancel any lease or permit when such
threat is more likely, more serious, and outweighs the advantages of
continuation. However, under certain circumstances, cancellation ‘shall entitle
the lessee to compensation”. [24]
With regard to regulating safety, MMS is charged with the duty to “require on all
new drilling and production operations, and whenever practicable, on existing
operations, the use of the best available and safest technologies which [it]
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determines to be economically feasible, whenever failure of equipment would
have a significant effect on safety, health or the environment, except where [it]
determines that the incremental benefits are clearly insufficient to justify the
incremental costs…”. [25]
This reference to a cost-benefit template for deciding whether to require best
“available and safest technologies” is a legal requirement which MMS must
adhere to, and if it fails to do so when setting a standard or taking other action
requiring a safer technology, it is highly likely that the affected operators would
seek judicial review and also very likely that the reviewing court would reject
the MMS action because it did not meet the statutory requirement.
The OCSLA cost-benefit test for a new regulatory action is reinforced by
Presidential directive. Since Reagan, Presidents have directed agencies to justify
new regulations by presenting an analysis to the President’s Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) which shows that benefits (e.g. fewer deaths
and injuries) would exceed costs (e.g. costs of compliance by the regulated
industry, costs to consumers, etc.). Although monetizing benefits and
discounting future costs and benefits is an arbitrary process, and environmental
and safety advocates has strongly opposed such Presidential directives because
they restrain agencies from robust regulatory initiatives, agencies like MMS are
subject to Presidential management directives and routinely comply. At this
time, the prior directive continues in effect because it has not been rescinded
by Obama. [26]
OCSLA further provides that any company holding a lease or permit is required
to protect the health and safety of workers and contractor employees by
complying with occupational safety and health standards, the “general duty” to
maintain workplaces free from “recognized hazards”, applicable regulations on
health, safety and the environment of other agencies, and additional safeguards
required in MMS-approved work plans. Companies are also required to allow
agency inspectors access to work sites and relevant records.[27]
Penalties are set forth for non-compliance with lease or permit terms or
regulations, for willful and knowing violations, for fraud and falsification.[28] In
addition, the law authorizes several types of private lawsuits. Individuals may
bring private enforcement actions in federal court against a company or DOI to
compel compliance with OCSLA under specified circumstances. Residents of the
US may seek compensation for injuries caused by failure of an operator to
comply with a regulation. And any aggrieved party may seek judicial review of
agency decisions on leases and permits.[29]
OCSLA assigns regulatory and enforcement functions to MMS and the Coast
Guard (CG), and specifically provides that OCS workplace safety regulations are
to be enforced by the CG. The CG is also directed to conduct scheduled
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inspection of safety equipment, periodic unscheduled inspections without prior
notice, and investigations of incidents causing death, serious injury, fires, and
“major” oil spills (exceeding 200 barrels in a 30 day period).[30]
In doing so, the statute ignores the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), which is the workplace safety regulator of onshore oil
and gas operations and most other industrial sectors. OSHA has therefore
refrained from regulating safety in OCS exploration, production and servicing
operations because of the CG role defined by OCSLA and also because the law
which empowers OSHA, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
[31]precludes it from regulating “working conditions of employees with respect
to which other Federal agencies…exercise statutory authority to prescribe or
enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety or health”. [32]
For these reasons, OSHA officially ceded worker safety regulation and
enforcement to the CG in several interagency memoranda of agreement years
ago, [33] and recently confirmed their unwillingness to get involved in OCS
operations, during Congressional hearings that were held in the aftermath of
the BP accident.[34] As a result, OSHA expertise and regulations which have
been very useful in promoting safety in onshore oil and gas operations, such as
its rule on “process safety management,”[35] have not been applied to OCS
operations.[36]
In addition, OCSLA does not authorize or even mention worker involvement in
the development of safety regulations, industrial standards, inspections, and
safety management, providing only that “the Coast Guard…may review any
allegation from any person of…a violation of a safety regulation…”[37]As a
result, there has been regulatory disregard for safeguarding workers on the
OCS, a problem further discussed later in this paper.

*******

The Norwegian approach, set forth in the Framework and four “common
regulations” of its integrated regulatory regime, addresses many of the same
risk issues as OCSLA. However, there are significant differences between the
two regimes with regard to the assignment and scope of responsibilities and
how they are to be implemented.
Norwegian laws and regulations focus on promoting self-regulation by
operators by directly requiring each operator to develop and apply an “internal
control” system for reducing risks and preventing and responding to accidents,
a system which reflects “a sound health, environment and safety culture.”[38] In
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contrast, the US approach in OCSLA focuses on assigning regulatory
responsibilities to several agencies and discusses operators mainly with regard
to their duties to comply with the regulations of several agencies and the
sanctions they would incur for non-compliance, as discussed previously.
Another distinction is that the Framework sets forth in very broad terms the
functions that operators should perform for internal control, with
accompanying non-binding Guidelines, but without prescriptive details.[39]
However, it recognizes that a performance-based, internal control system
necessarily leads to operator adoption of industrial standards and compliance
with certification requisites of various technical and international
organizations.[40] Because this could compromise safety and lead to “business
as usual”,[41] PSA has been assigned the critical roles of supervising operator
performance of the functions, cooperating with operators and labor unions in
problem-solving and addressing new technologies and circumstances, and
determining by a consent process when an operator’s approach is
suitable.[42]Thus, Norway has created a PSA-managed, non-adversarial
approach to building safety systems within each company.
In contrast, the OCSLA approach, previously discussed, emphasizes the police
function of regulatory agencies, inspections, and the threat of sanctions,
thereby creating a legalistic and adversarial relationship between operators and
regulators. This is typical of many US laws enacted by Congress with the
expectation that agency regulations will be of a “command and control”,
detailed and prescriptive nature, and strictly enforced. However, US experience
indicates that this approach often leads to low rates of compliance, and agency
exemptions and rule-bending to relax overly-detailed prescriptive
requirements, as has occurred to some extent under OCSLA. [43]
Thus, it is claimed that the Norwegian approach enables operators to quickly
adapt internal controls to the dynamics of OCS exploitation, such as
technological advance, new site-specific circumstances, and new knowledge
about accident prevention without the need for an agency to formally enact new
regulations[44], which would be required under the US approach. This allegedly
more agile Norwegian approach also produces operator-specific internal
controls rather than the generic, “one size fits all” regulations enacted by MMS
and other US agencies, a cumbersome, time-consuming process which often
leads to judicial review and further delay.
However, the US approach is more transparent and publicly-accountable, and is
supplemented by the threats of enforcement and sanctions and private lawsuits
previously discussed. In addition, operator-specific restrictions can be imposed
by MMS and the CG based on their reviews of each operator’s project design
and proposed operation, and subsequent inspections. Also, the OCSLA
mandate, which does not explicitly call for functional or performance-based
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regulations nor acknowledge acceptability of industrial standards because of
traditional public mistrust and demand for prescriptive rules, essentially forces
agencies to publicly provide legal and factual justification for taking such
approaches.
And in contrast to Norwegian reluctance to threaten operators with
enforcement and sanctions for non-compliance with functional requirements,
the US approach, at least in theory, uses fear of punitive action as a deterrent
against operator violation of rules and standards. Thus, the Norwegian
approach relies greatly on trust and PSA supervision and expertise, whereas the
US approach reflects mistrust and relies on fear of sanctions and liability.
Another fundamental difference involves the regard shown for workers and
labor union involvement in addressing safety issues. Norwegian culture, laws
such as the Working Environment Act, and the Framework emphasize a
tripartite approach to safety which involves labor, industry and government as
equal participants in developing regulations, problem-solving and the
application of internal controls.[45]
This “Nordic OSH regime”in the OCS context is implemented by several
collaborative structures within companies: a working environment committee
for managers and employees to discuss safety and related issues, election by
workers of a safety representative at each worksite, and having occupational
safety and health experts on call as consultants to help resolve disputes and
provide services to the internal control system.[46]
Worker safety representatives play a pivotal role in that they represent
employees in safety discussions with agencies and operators, and actively use
their authority to halt dangerous work in oil and gas operations and activities,
much as they do in other Norwegian industrial sectors. Recent studies find that
they are rarely contested by management, force problem-solving, and have a
“positive effect” on employee health and safety except with regard to”
subcontractor employees who move constantly” between projects.[47]
The range of union concerns now extends beyond worker safety and labor
issues. The Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions has recently decided to
expand the scope of its interests and advocacy beyond worker safety to
encompass environmental and sustainability issues in negotiating collective
agreements with industrial groups, topics it had previously neglected. [48]
There is continuing concern expressed by labor unions and safety advocates
that the Nordic OSH model for OCS operations will be undermined by several
developments: operator adoption of industrial standards for internal control,
an increase in operators from countries that show less regard for workers and
unions, market forces which lead operators to increase hiring of temporary
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workers, and management application of behavior-based approaches to the
workforce.[49]
Of special concern to unions is operator use of methods for changing worker
behavior, which many in industry instinctively turn to as a means of reducing
injuries and accidents instead of making more costly improvements in facilities
and operations.. The union view is that this approach, now being promoted in
the “Step Change” project in the United Kingdom OCS, is based on discredited
studies by DuPont, insurers, and others, shifts the burden of safety from
management to workers, mistreats and demeans workers, undermines unions,
and violates the Norwegian Working Environment Act.[50]
Nevertheless, workplace safety and union involvement, although vulnerable to
these trends, are fully integrated into the Norwegian approach to accident
prevention and internal control systems. In contrast, the limited presence of
unions in US OCS operations and the US approach under OCSLA, previously
discussed, has resulted in a complete failure to provide these features in
regulating OCS operations.
Finally, there is a subtle difference between Norwegian and US approaches on
the matter of adhering to cost-benefit analysis (cba) when determining the level
of safety to be provided. As previously discussed, OCSLA and Presidential
directives have firmly established cba as the regulatory basis for deciding“how
safe is safe enough”, and MMS and the CG have diligently complied.
The Norwegian approach is more ambiguous and less doctrinaire. The
Framework provides that an operator shall prevent harms in accordance with
applicable laws, its own internal control, and PSA acceptance criteria, and “Over
and above this level the risk shall be further reduced to the extent possible.”
The same provision then modifies “to the extent possible” by adding that “in
effectuating risk reduction”, the operator is to choose” solutions” which” offer
the best results, provided the associated costs are not significantly
disproportionate to the risk reduction achieved.” [51]
In addition, several sections of the “common regulations” deal with risk
reduction functions in terms that also avoid imposing a strict cba test. For
example, the Facilities Regulations provided, in part, that facilities “shall be
designed so that …b) the major accident risk becomes as low as practically
possible…”[52] However, according to an industry representative, the word
“practically ”will be officially deleted, a change opposed by industry because the
resulting “as low as possible” test for facility safety would be a more stringent
requirement.[53]
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Thus, a strict cost-benefit test is avoided,, making operators accountable for
reducing risks to the extent they can be reduced, so long as the costs do not
significantly outweigh benefits. Working this out in actual practice poses a
challenge for PSA supervision. Nevertheless it affords a more robust approach
to safety than the US approach.
The Norwegian approach to safety offshore presents a very interesting
progressive alternative which asks much more of operators than the
mechanistic regulatory compliance approach of the US. Prior to enactment of its
integrated approach in 2002, Norway experienced several OCS accidents
causing fatalities and spills: e.g. Bravo blowout in 1977, West Vanguard gas
blowout, Alexander Kjelland capsize and deaths, and Bronneysund transport
accident and deaths. However, since 2002, no such accidents have occurred
and the Snorre near miss incident has been studied to develop improvements in
internal control.
There are many compelling reasons to reform the US approach. A serious
attempt to do this must involve thorough consideration of the Norwegian
approach.

4. Regulation.
Regulation of OCS oil and gas activities must be done in accordance with the
directions provided by OCSLA. Most of the directions regarding permits and the
safety of operations are briefly stated in broad terms. Thus, MMS has had
considerable discretion in making permit decisions, designing rules, and setting
standards, and the CG has similarly had discretion in regulating workplace
safety.[54]
In the aftermath of the BP accident, MMS has been replaced by a new Bureau of
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). [55] BSEE inherits the regulatory
program built by MMS over 30 years and will undoubtedly modify the MMS
program to correct weaknesses. However, it will have to carry out the same
basic regulatory functions mandated by OCSLA. Although OCSLA itself may be
amended by Congress, Congressional and Presidential proposals thusfar have
not recommended changes to the basic regulatory functions. Thus, it is
instructive to consider aspects of MMS performance that need to be improved
upon by BSEE, and to also consider the role played by CG.
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The basic regulatory functions of the MMS regulatory program include:
(1) enacting or incorporating by reference the rules, standards, and practices
for governing OCS exploration and production operations, as well as OCS
pipelines, to ensure safety and efficiency;
(2) conducting several reviews to ensure that proposed operations and facilities
will comply with these regulations and then issuing permits; *
(3) conducting post-permit inspections to ensure that compliance is being
maintained throughout operations;
(4) enforcing and imposing sanctions for non-compliance, and
(5) participating in CG coordination of activities in response to accidents and
spills.
The scope of the MMS regulatory program to be inherited by BSEE has therefore
encompassed virtually all aspects of OCS permitting, drilling, production and
contingency management. [56]
The program has some distinctive features. One is that most of the MMS and
CG rules and standards are prescriptive rather than performance-based.
Another is that many of these were adopted from or incorporate by reference
industrial standards and recommended practices originally developed by the
American Petroleum Institute (API) and several engineering societies and private
standards organizations.
Another feature is that the inspection function, according to MMS, is conducted
“to enforce operator compliance” with regulations. As described by MMS, this
has involved announced and unannounced inspections, reviews of an operator’s
compliance documentation, providing regulatory compliance training to rig
managers, and performing safety inspections “on behalf of the U.S. Coast
Guard”. Its summary of what inspectors have looked for consists of checklists
for numerous “Potential Incidents of Non-Compliance” (PINC’s), which for
example include 160 PINC’s for a drilling rig, and other “verifications” that
detailed technical requirements are being met. For workplace safety, it has
conducted, on behalf of the CG, “a general safety walk-through of the facility
looking for general housekeeping hazards related to
slips/trips/falls/railings/open gratings”.[57] Several thousand inspections were
carried out in 2009 at 331 well sites in the GOM.[58]
__________________________
* The pre-permit reviews involve environmental, engineering, design and financial
responsibility evaluations of applications for permits, and include, for example, applying design
specifications for blowout prevention and well control, and other standards for equipment and
operational procedures. The agency has also added special requisites as stipulations to permits
when necessary for safety and spill control, and required deepwater operations plans and
additional information on mobile platforms for special evaluation.
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This type of highly prescriptive, compliance-oriented regulatory program is
common in the U.S. It is the cultural construct of a society in which free-market
values compete with public demands for safety and holding companies
accountable, where industry and regulators are viewed as adversaries because
companies are expected to be opportunistic and agencies are expected to
prescribe and police their behavior, where companies lobby against new
“burdensome” regulations and agencies are under constant pressure from
industry, states, Congress and the President to be accommodating to business
and other economic interests yet somehow prevent harms. The problems that
arise from this type of regulation are apparent in several regulatory sectors, for
example in the regulation of financial services, auto and air transport, food and
drug products, and the extractive industries which include hard and soft (oil
and gas) minerals mining.[59]
In theory, the regulatory program built by MMS has its merits, but like any
regulatory approach, it requires robust implementation for credibility and
success. Since the BP accident, implementation of this program has been
critically evaluated and there is now ample evidence that agency performance
over the last decade deteriorated in several respects. The following discussion
focuses on some of these deficiencies in order to derive “lessons learned” that
may be of value to BSEE, and is not intended to exonerate BP or any other OCS
operators and contractors.
Assessing and Using Environmental Impact Studies.
Since enactment of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) in 1969,
federal agencies must consider the environmental impacts of their intended
actions, as previously discussed. The purpose is to have the agencies acquire
knowledge of environmental features likely to be adversely affected and to use
this knowledge to modify their actions in ways which will avoid or mitigate the
potential impacts. MMS has routinely complied with NEPA for its intended lease
sales, but developed a “categorical exclusion” policy exempting exploration
permits, claiming that the subsequent drilling operations would not incur major
spills or cause other significant impacts. By exempting exploration, MMS
avoided the delay and resource commitments involved in conducting,
disseminating, reviewing and defending environmental impact studies, and
expedited permitting and exploration. By doing so, it willfully gave away the
opportunity to acquire information that would have enabled it to stipulate
appropriate spill control and emergency response requirements in permits as
precautionary measures.[60]
Because the BP permit had been categorically excluded, this MMS policy has
been attacked as a cause of the vast environmental damage that ensued.

18
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1705812

Although the agency had previously done three environmental studies for its
GOM 5 year leasing plan, its combined lease sales in the GOM, and its lease sale
to BP, these were broader, less detailed with regard to specific site conditions
and operational features, and thereby less useful in addressing the potential
impacts of a BP blowout and major spill at the deepwater Macondo site and the
adjacent coastal region.
MMS apparently allowed its “production” role as lessor and expediter of
deepwater drilling, as defined by OCSLA and promoted by political forces, to
overwhelm its environmental protection role. As previously discussed, these
roles will now be carried out by separate agencies. In addition, it is expected
that its successor, the BSEE, will require more thorough compliance with NEPA,
more precautionary estimates of spill potential and impacts, and restrict use of
categorical exclusions for deepwater permits.[61] The generic lesson is that
agencies, like companies, have a tendency to emphasize production at the
expense of safety in U.S. regulatory culture, even when they have no explicit
legal mandate for production, and that continuing independent oversight is
needed to ensure their robust performance of safety responsibilities, similar to
that exercised by PSA in Norway.
Reliance on Industry Standards.
MMS and CG delegated many of their regulatory responsibilities to industrial
and technical organizations, especially the American Petroleum Institute (API),
by adopting or incorporating by reference their voluntary standards and
recommended practices, or otherwise accepting them as consensus standards.
This was done for the good purpose of drawing on the technical, experiencebased safety expertise of these organizations and their research resources. But
it was also done for some less salutary reasons, and over time, this reliance has
contributed to the deterioration of in-house expertise at the agencies, which
has been highlighted in recent studies of their performance. As a result, the
agencies allowed the industry to determine the progress and quality of safety
regulation to a considerable extent.
For example, MMS had accumulated data over many years linking most
accidents to inadequate company performance of four of the 12 safety
management functions* set forth in API’s Recommended Practice 75, as
previously discussed. RP-75 broadly covers the major features of safety and
environmental management systems for OCS operations, and is known as API’s
SEMP rule. It was enacted in 1993, and company compliance has been
voluntary.[62]
___________________________________
* According to MMS, the 4 functions implicated in most accidents were hazard analysis,
management of change, written operational procedures and mechanical integrity, and their
inadequate performance was due to poor communications, failings in supervision and
maintenance of operations, and uncorrected workplace hazards
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Even though MMS had such accident data and found no trend towards accident
reduction over several years, it continued to rely on voluntary compliance with
SEMP until the BP accident when it hurriedly proposed its own rule to compel
company performance of the four functions.[63] This case and others illustrate
MMS deferral to industry on safety management and its failure to maintain
oversight and take the steps needed to prevent continuation of certain
accident-causing activities.[64]
The CG for many years has refrained from enacting its own rules and standards
for OCS workplace safety but has referenced, and claims to enforce, hundreds
of industrial and technical standards.[65] As previously discussed, OCSLA’a
assignment of workplace safety responsibilities to the CG has had the legal
effect of precluding the more expert OSHA from this role. [66]
In an article published shortly before the BP accident, the recently retired chief
of CG’s Office of Standards Evaluation and Development stated that “our efforts
today are guided by OMB Circular A-119” which “directs agencies to use
voluntary consensus standards in lieu of government-unique standards, except
where inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical” and thereby reduce
government-unique standards “to a minimum” in order to eliminate costs to
the government, encourage economic growth and promote economic
competition. As a result, CG has adopted some 450 industrial standards which
“saves potentially thousands of pages of federal regulations” and “saves the
Coast Guard over $1.5 million annually”.[67]
According to a post-BP accident article, CG worked at removing what it
considered to be barriers that Impede productivity and commerce. However,
interviewed officials acknowledged that their oversight of rigs should have been
more rigorous, that “the pace of technology has outrun the current
regulations”, and that they had inspected BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig 9 times
without finding any “major issues”.[68] In addition, CG also transferred its
workplace inspection responsibilities to MMS.[69] Refraining from developing
its own regulations and relying on others to develop standards and safeguard
workers have taken their toll on CG expertise.
At Congressional hearings in 2007[70], CG was depicted by several witnesses
as having a semi-military, command and control culture, failing to build inhouse expertise because of its policy of rotating junior level officers throughout
several of its missions, and being insensitive to the circumstances of employees
in business organizations. The Gulf Coast Mariners Association, created by four
labor unions, testified that CG “marginalized” workers by relying exclusively on
managers for information, has too little experience in civilian marine activities,
fails to enforce injury reporting requirements, and has not regulated workplace
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safety in a manner comparable to OSHA regulation of other workplaces. The
Association recommended transferring CG’s workplace safety functions to a
civilian agency.
Reliance on industry standards and practices must be carefully supervised to
avoid several types of problems: to prevent deterioration of the agency’s
technical competence, to prevent industry takeover of the agency so that it’s
program does no more than accommodate “business as usual”, to ensure that
the agency’s mandate for safety is robustly pursued and attentive to the
concerns and information of value that can be provided by workers, unions, and
environmental organizations.
But more than supervision is needed. Steps must be taken to ensure the
integrity and objectivity of the industrial and technical organizations that
agencies look to for expertise. Consider that API, which has developed some
500 standards and practices, many of which have been adopted by MMS and
CG, also spends millions annually to aggressively lobby and coordinate
campaigns against new laws and regulatory initiatives to improve safety
because of its members’ opposition to bureaucracy and additional costs. [71]
Consider that API and others do not invite the participation of unions and
workers who often have intimate knowledge about inadequate safety practices
and gaps in safety management which could help reduce accident risks.[72]
Consider further that API and other industrial organizations which supplied
MMS and CG with sub-optimal standards and practices, failed to ensure that
voluntary practices were being followed, and in many cases failed to address
known risks and new safety measures, remain unaccountable for harmful
consequences. These issues need to be addressed in the investigation of
agency reliance on industrial standards which has recently been launched by
leaders of the new Bureaus which replaced MMS. [73].
Inspection of Operations.
According to MMS and CG, the main purpose of their inspection programs has
been to ensure and enforce compliance with numerous rules. MMS claims that
its inspection program has been comprehensive and in the GOM in 2009, for
example, it conducted some 561 drilling inspections, 3678 production
inspections, 3342 “personal safety” inspections (many for the CG), and many
other inspections as well. [74] As discussed earlier, Inspectors have used a
“national checklist” called the Potential Incidents of Noncompliance list which is
a compilation of yes/no questions addressing operator compliance with all
applicable regulations. [75] Upon detecting a violation, MMS has notified the
operator and if the violation remains uncorrected and is “severe’, has imposed
sanctions such as “shut-ins” and monetary penalties.
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Thus, its approach to inspection reflects an extreme form of proceduralization,
i.e. the reduction of the complexities of safety management to a simplistic
standardized checklist format for the purpose of policing operator compliance
with many prescriptive rules. This raises the questions of its efficacy, and
whether it deprives the inspection function of a more holistic appraisal of safety
management in real time practice, and the agency’s ability to determine if the
behavioral, technical and organizational aspects of safety management
converge to create a healthy safety culture at each facility. [76] Put another way,
has MMS been missing the forest by focusing on each of the trees?
As discussed earlier in this paper, MMS has acknowledged that there has been
no discernible improvement in the reduction of accidents, fatalities, injuries,
loss of well control, fires and spills over a studied seven year period in which it
issued each year some 150 findings of non-compliance in GOM operations. In
addition, several investigations have found that both MMS and CG have had
problems in hiring and retaining staff with sufficient technical expertise for
overseeing and inspecting sophisticated operations and questioned the
technical capacity of the agencies in this regard. [77] Federal investigators have
also verified that MMS had been an inconsistent and compromised performer of
inspection and other functions in some cases because members of its staff had
“inappropriate relationships’ with industry personnel, including gift-taking and
sexual relationships, and questioned whether its oversight activities were
sufficient to ensure safe operations offshore. [78]
Finally, there is the issue of jurisdictional ambiguity. At hearings recently held
by a Congressional committee, presentations by Coast Guard, Department of
Interior and OSHA officials were made defining their regulatory and inspection
roles offshore. Considerable confusion arose because their jurisdictional
boundaries were shown to be ambiguous and arbitrarily defined and with some
apparent conflicts, causing confusion among the Congressional committee
members. For example, the CG claims responsibility for mobile drilling rigs and
BSEE (as with its MMS predecessor) claims responsibility for fixed platforms, But
CG is also responsible for workplace safety on fixed platforms with MMS
responsible for what occurs below the platforms. OSHA’s responsibility for what
is unregulated and unenforced by CG and MMS/BSEE is therefore highly
uncertain. The chairman of the committee called this regulatory disarray a
“jurisdictional mishmash” and the absence of OSHA’s process safety
management rule a critical shortcoming. The hearings will continue to explore
this state of confusion which obviously impairs the inspection function and its
efficacy for safety. [79]
Thus, there are lessons to be learned from MMS experience about the conduct
of a compliance-oriented inspection program, such as its vulnerability when
staffed by under-qualified inspectors, confused by jurisdictional ambiguities, or
compromised by ethical lapses. But much larger questions need to be
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considered as BSEE assumes direction of the regulatory program regarding the
efficacy of compliance-based inspection of complex industrial activities for
accident prevention, and the efficacy of alternative approaches in which the
inspector’s role would involve a more holistic appraisal of activities at a facility
and trust-building educative functions. [80]
More Issues to Consider.
Through the lens of safety science, deeper issues can be discerned and should
provide the foundation for reforming offshore regulation and safety
management. The field of safety science is interdisciplinary and is populated by
practitioners in industry and government, consultants and academics. Their
activities reflect a convergence of behavioral and organizational specialists with
technical and legal counterparts and produce insights, many of which have
eventually been recognized and adopted by regulatory and industrial safety
programs.
One such insight is the concept of “drift”, developed by Jens Rasmussen,[81]
which provides that the efficacy of a regulatory program or safety management
system deteriorates as operations move outside the envelope of conditions and
circumstances it was originally created to deal with. This is a common
occurrence and is often not recognized until a major accident occurs. In the
case of the MMS regulatory program, its continuing application to operations
moving into deeper waters and using new facilities (such as mobile, semisubmersible drilling rigs) has led to the BP accident and other deepwater
incidents. Even though MMS added requirements for deepwater and mobile rigs
to its permits, these were “add-ons” and not fully integrated into the regulatory
program.
Another insight that seems relevant to MMS, in retrospect, is the concept of
legitimization or normalization of deviance, as developed by Diane Vaughan.
[82] This concept provides that many small behavioral and technical deviations
e.g. “short cuts”) commonly occur over time within a regulatory program or
safety management system without being addressed. Eventually, the new norms
can undermine the program or system to the point where it is incapable of
preventing certain types of accidents. In the case of MMS and CG, many
deviations regarding their review and inspection procedures, as discussed
previously, seem to be implicated in the accidents that have ensued in recent
years. It should be noted that when a prescriptive regulatory program
deteriorates in this way, it is inevitable that company safety management
system will also deteriorate.
Finally, there is the Norwegian concept, set forth in its Framework
regulation,[83] that regulation should be directed towards building company
self-regulation in the form of internal controls, rather than being used as a
policing program to enforce non-compliance with many detailed rules. In the
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case of MMS and CG, it is becoming apparent that their prescriptive policing
approach did not lead to a coherently organized and supervised internal control
system on the Deepwater Horizon rig leased by BP. Investigations of the BP
accident reveal the management disarray on the Deepwater Horizon that
prevailed and contributed to the accident, a disarray between BP, the lessor,
Transocean, and the major contractors regarding equipment and pressure
testing, cementing, and other matters.
The failure of a prescriptive regulatory approach to build coherent, competent
and integrated facility operations management should be a major consideration
as reforms of the MMS program are made. Dealing with this very critical issue
inevitably leads to consideration of the self-regulatory approach being pursued
by Norwegian authorities and the question of its viability in the U.S. cultural and
regulatory context, to be discussed below.
5. The Self regulation Option.
(to be inserted)
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